What is "Atheism" Allowed to Mean?

I have seen a resurgence of discussion surrounding definitions and uses of words like "atheism" and "agnosticism". In addition, I have also seen the issue of burdens of justification talked about in a similar context. I think that a lot of the disagreement that exists in atheist and skeptic communities revolves around definitional differences and is exacerbated by a lot of people talking past each other. Because of this, I thought that I would contribute my two cents and see if I can at least clear things up for myself.

First and foremost, the big disagreement revolves around the definition of "atheism" itself. Some claim that the word means or ought to mean the rejection of theistic claims; others claim that it ought to mean the belief that there is no God or are no gods; and yet others claim that the word should be interpreted through the grammatical logic of its composition as simply meaning "not theism", which would mean a simple lack of belief in the people it concerns. There are good and bad arguments for and against each of these positions.

Going in reverse order, I will start with the "lack of belief" definitional claim. I'll start with what I think the strengths of this definition are. In the first place, this definition could be inferred directly from the word if someone didn't already know what it was. This allows for a certain transparency in meaning. This definition also follows the logical grammar of the word setup, which allows for a reduction of ambiguity during philosophical or technical discussion about the issue. People often criticize this definition for being too broad. They claim that it would open the doors to cats, babies, and rocks all being atheists, since the technically lack beliefs in gods. I think this is a bad argument simply because we have other words that could similarly be applied to seemingly absurd objects or parties, but that we're fine with using only in their sensible ways. The perfect example of this is "asexual". Technically, rocks are asexual, since they don't have sex, but it's not useful to talk about them that way; it can be taken as granted that rocks will be asexual. If a mature human is asexual, or an organism reproduces without sex, then the word is useful to use. A more valid criticism of this definition of the word is simple common and technical usage. I strongly tend toward descriptivism in my opinions on language, and in the case of the word "atheism", where it hasn't mean "amorality" historically, it has meant the belief that there is no God and are no gods. In philosophical circles, this has also been the long-time meaning of the word. This third definition includes this common and technical definition, but it is not exclusive to them.

The middle meaning of "atheism" is the classical definition of the word. This is the one that means the belief that God or gods don't exist. The benefit here is obvious: the word means what it already means, and not much has to be changed. The disadvantage here is that the word doesn't perfectly comply to logic in the sense of grammar. In addition, to the people who identify as atheists in this sense, they would adopt a burden of justification for their belief. As Ozymandias Ramses II of Youtube points out, however, this justification isn't too cumbersome to discharge. It is also different from the belief that God or gods can't exist, which has a much larger burden of justification.

The third definition is, I will confess, my favorite of the three. This is not because I think that it is particularly more meritorious than the others; I simply like how it sounds the best. In this definition, the rejection of theistic claims, it sort of combines the strengths and weaknesses of the other two definitions. This is not exactly the case, but it is fairly close. With the rejection definition, it means that the individual in question (the "atheist" whom this "atheism" describes) is familiar with at least some god claims, but doesn't accept them as true. This still includes the second definition of the negative beliefs, but is not quite as open as the third definition. It automatically excludes those individuals who are unfamiliar with theistic claims, getting rid of the first problem for the third definition; however, it is still subject to the problems of grammar-defiance and common-use-defiance of the other definitions.

So, which of these definitions is the best? I am prepared to claim that not only do I not know which is best, but that I also think there isn't a best one. As long as we have enough terms to cover all of the various logical points a positions, I don't really care what these terms are. The important criteria are, I think, that there is a consensus of opinion (or at least use) in the atheist community and that there is an ultimate successful penetration of public consciousness with this definition.

I see no inherent problem with attempting a top-down definitional change for a word or words. It has happened in the past without damaging the discourse of the subject. One of my favorite examples of this is the concerted effort the homosexual community applied to getting the word "gay" to mean "homosexual". Their approach was technically top-down (through activism), and I think that it was largely successful. Most people in the English-speaking world now think of homosexuality first when they hear the word "gay". I also think that this movement hasn't damaged the discussion about social or scientific/logical issues in homosexuality. I am not drawing a parallel between the social rights of homosexuals and the social perceptions of atheists. I'm comparing the actual process of word-changing.

In the end, I almost wish that we could just make up entirely new words for all of these issues and positions. That, however, would be a tall order to get permeated throughout public consciousness!

Equality and Defining Terms

I was in a certain class the other day, which reintroduced me to the whole "equality of opportunity versus outcome" concept. This was accompanied by a poorly executed thought experiment about a world with perfect equality and a rereading of Kurt Vonnegut's "Harrison Bergeron". The point of the entire class was to stress the superiority of the bottom-up equality of opportunity over the top-down equality of outcome.

This is, I think, a misguided attempt to convey the idea that differences are okay. While I agree entirely with the sentiment that differences can be entirely acceptable and even beneficial in social systems, I disagree with the use of the word "equality" as a blanket for these contrived lacks of differences. An entirely preferable terms for these situations would be either "homogeneity", or perhaps better yet, the phrase "lack of differences". We need to be explicit in these situations because confusion over terms and definitions could create material effects, and I think they may be antithetical to the long-term goals that most people would agree are worthwhile.

Before I continue into that vein of thought, it may be a good idea to expand on the differences I perceive between "equality" and literal or total "sameness". Equality, generally speaking, involves totals or sums. An example I like to use is that of a simple algebraic equation, wherein the sides of the equation (see the same root as "equal"!) can look very different, but are ultimately still equal. Sameness and homogeneity, however, would involve no differences whatever. Note that these terms are not synonymous either–homogeneity means that any component of the whole will appear the same, while sameness is vaguer (we see a descending categorical set of definitions). In these situations, there would still be equality; the same parts configured in the same ways will have the same sums. These are not, however, required for equality to exist.

It's important to remember that while equality, sameness, and homogeneity aren't subjective measures, they are affected by perspective. Often, these perspectives depend upon the coarse-grained views or models of reality (think of homogeneity in populations versus the actual individuals; none will be the exact same, but homogeneity can still be a useful term for the coarse-grained view). They can also depend on separate (but equal!) criteria or perspectives. My favorite example of this is isotropy in physics. From one perspective, something can look the same in every direction, but from every other perspective, there will be discrepancies (my favorite example of this is standing on top of a sombrero versus anywhere on the brim).

As an example of this, let's take a look at "Harrison Bergeron" again. The people of the United States in the year 2081 were all forced to be "equal" through imposed handicaps on people above average in any way. The result of this was equal outcome, but only in the sense of statistics like GDP. What the story fails to take into account (perhaps intentionally; I don't actually know Vonnegut's reasoning behind writing this) is the ear-splitting pain that George Bergeron experiences all day while his wife, Hazel, didn't. Examined this way, that sounds like a pretty unequal (and unfair!) outcome. The Handicapper General possessed a shotgun which she could use for enforcement of the law. Other people did not have the same authority, and they didn't have shotguns either. The most that could be said was that they actually had equality of opportunity in becoming the Handicapper General.

My goal in this is not to disparage "Harrison Bergeron" or to make the case for total equality, but I think it's important to get definitions straight. It's conceivable for there to be a society that has true equality of outcome while still not being homogeneous. This does not mean that it is useful to strive for that society, but it could most certainly be.

Let us now consider how different equality of opportunity outcome truly are. Now, "equality of opportunity" is usually used in reference to law and societal pressures, but just for the moment, let's entertain the literal definition so that we can get concepts straight. There are a great deal many opportunities that rely upon previous outcomes; indeed, I can't think of a single opportunity that is not at least partially based on the successful outcome of biological development. I don't think people would object to the treatments of disabilities and illnesses, despite the fact that these would be very material attempts to achieve healthy outcomes, which generally means within the range of "normal". I know people would object to my use of this as an example, saying something along the lines of "Treatment of disability and illness is not the same as imposing a university quota." and they'd be correct. I'm not saying that top-down impositions on what people choose to do is a good idea; I'm saying that attempts at equality of outcome don't have to be top-down. I'm also saying that equality of opportunity can depend upon equality of outcome, not just vice-versa.