Plausibility is Always a Part of it, but it May not be so Obvious

Being a person who likes neat mental hierarchies, Hume's Problem of Induction and the implications of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems (particularly the unprovability and unfalsifiability [in a logical sense] of certain parts of axiomatic systems–namely mathematics and Aristotelian logic) have emotionally nagged at me ever since I learned about them. In a recent episode of "Rationally Speaking", a podcast which I enjoy immensely, I was reminded of Quine's Web of Belief, which involves various belief strands with various thicknesses, but wherein the snapping of one strand does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the whole web. This is like an analogy I've heard, wherein all empirical claims are accompanied by a permanent asterisk, which is essentially saying "There is no ultimate basis for this." Even despite my desire for a rigid hierarchical system of bases, this answer is still somewhat satiating. This is especially the case, since the concept of an ultimate basis may be incoherent in any case, and this answer essentially says, "We don't have it and we also don't need it." All of this is to say that even on deep levels, the best probable view of the universe will be Bayesian in some sense. This means that plausibility is unavoidable when reasoning about the world.

What I'm saying is not that logicians should arrive at their conclusions through Bayesian reasoning, merely that there's always some level that involves plausibility. That doesn't mean that there aren't epistemic levels where same-level plausibility shouldn't be considered, however.

An example that pops to mind is that of the court and criminal justice systems. In the United States and many other parts of the Western world, a very important aspect of the criminal justice system is "innocent until proven guilty", or Presumption of Innocence. I will say that while I don't think that this is particularly epistemically sound, I agree wholeheartedly that this is how the actual execution of law should be carried out. I think that the empirical position that should be taken in a situation devoid of evidence is one of agnosticism, or a lack of knowledge; however, this should be treated as the equivalent of innocence under the law, and that is, I think, the intent behind the law. This is a perfect situation where the plausibility of guilt should not really be considered on the level of criminal justice. There should be hard and conclusive evidence demonstrating guilt before that ruling is administered, and that evidence should be conclusive from the starting point of neutrality, no matter how high the prior statistical plausibility is (consider, say, a case involving an individual belonging to an of the ethnic minorities that commit much more of a type of crime on average). The plausibility comes into play with the epistemic problems of evidence-gathering in the first place, but it is used only extremely sparingly when considering guilt on the actual level of criminal justice.

Similarly, I actually think that this should be the goal in social reasoning as well. By this, I mean the assumption of guilt on a social level, or that equivalent. In this case, I don't think that it should actually be illegal to consider plausibility in the Bayesian sense, but I do think that it should be a societal goal to eliminate at least the extremes in this case. I care much more about avoiding the creation of a social pariah from an "innocent" person than the missing of a "guilty" person.

In some senses, these are anti-utilitarian arguments, and I understand that various strains of utilitarianism can be very valuable even in social settings. I wouldn't, for example, want to seriously risk ruining a million lives just because I didn't feel that my evidence for guilt wasn't absolute and thus didn't justify treating a hypothetical person as being guilty. I don't think it's as simple as a calculation, however. There are values other than sheer maximization of intelligent happiness and minimization of intelligent suffering that must be weighed. I guess I'll have to go with the better-feeling, yet vaguer "flourishing" versus "suffering".

For this very reason, discussions about social justice on individual and even lager scales can be very difficult to have. Part of the problem will inevitably come from conflicting values. Unfortunately, morals and ethical axioms aren't objective, no matter how hard some people try to claim that they are. Even putting generally unreasonably moral systems like religions aside, some people will simply disagree that we should value the freedom of the innocent more than the imprisonment of the guilty. I find that this opinion often comes from a somewhat immature (in my opinion!) reciprocal justice view of the world, but that's not necessarily the case. There are many perfectly valid, naturalistic ethical views that conflict. That doesn't mean that progress can't be made, however. I think it should behoove us (as intelligent, sentient beings) to engage in critical discourse and to come to the best consensus that we can.

The Ethics of Promoting Teen Sobriety

I don't like alcohol. I never have, and I don't foresee liking it in the future. Most of the drinks alcohol can be found in taste awful. I have never enjoyed the flavor of an alcoholic beverage more than its non-alcoholic counterpart. My dislike goes further, however. I have a disdain for intoxicating substances in general; one: they make me feel ill, and two: I don't like anything that makes my grasp of the real world more tenuous. Everything is topped off with the semi-consciousness-permeating fact that alcohol is one of the most toxic drugs we know of. It is really easy for people to overdose from alcohol after consuming intoxicating amounts, which means that it will likely happen oftener than for other drugs, even just comparing death rates to use rates. Of course, sheer use over time causes plenty of health issues as well, such as brain and liver damage.

I also don't oppose the imposition of a minimum drinking age, and I even think that twenty-one is a fine age for that; of course, I think that people shouldn't be able to join the military until at least twen-ty-one to twenty-five. The point is that I am not opposed to preventing teen drinking. In the town where I live, however, an all-night after-prom was recently hosted, and a friend of mine made the interesting point that having teens stay up all night and then drive home could potentially create a threat at least as large as drinking. Sleep deprivation can impair performance as much as alcohol, and the kind of sleep deprivation that all-night events create could be up to twenty-four hours of wakefulness. This brought an interesting question to bear: How much can be justifiably risked or sacrificed to promote sobriety in general or teen sobriety specifically? To me, it seems that it is completely unacceptable to risk more lives and healths than would be endangered by alcohol to avoid alcohol. At the same time, it seems obvious that alcohol can have a much more destructive influence over people than simple driving risks, and so that can't be the only measure inspected.

I have to make sure that I fight against my own bias on this issue, but at the same time, I don't want to bend over too far backward to avoid my bias. I think it should behoove groups promoting sobriety to examine their methods for efficacy and safety. We certainly don't want more endangerment coming out of endeavors to reduce it.

Equality and Defining Terms

I was in a certain class the other day, which reintroduced me to the whole "equality of opportunity versus outcome" concept. This was accompanied by a poorly executed thought experiment about a world with perfect equality and a rereading of Kurt Vonnegut's "Harrison Bergeron". The point of the entire class was to stress the superiority of the bottom-up equality of opportunity over the top-down equality of outcome.

This is, I think, a misguided attempt to convey the idea that differences are okay. While I agree entirely with the sentiment that differences can be entirely acceptable and even beneficial in social systems, I disagree with the use of the word "equality" as a blanket for these contrived lacks of differences. An entirely preferable terms for these situations would be either "homogeneity", or perhaps better yet, the phrase "lack of differences". We need to be explicit in these situations because confusion over terms and definitions could create material effects, and I think they may be antithetical to the long-term goals that most people would agree are worthwhile.

Before I continue into that vein of thought, it may be a good idea to expand on the differences I perceive between "equality" and literal or total "sameness". Equality, generally speaking, involves totals or sums. An example I like to use is that of a simple algebraic equation, wherein the sides of the equation (see the same root as "equal"!) can look very different, but are ultimately still equal. Sameness and homogeneity, however, would involve no differences whatever. Note that these terms are not synonymous either–homogeneity means that any component of the whole will appear the same, while sameness is vaguer (we see a descending categorical set of definitions). In these situations, there would still be equality; the same parts configured in the same ways will have the same sums. These are not, however, required for equality to exist.

It's important to remember that while equality, sameness, and homogeneity aren't subjective measures, they are affected by perspective. Often, these perspectives depend upon the coarse-grained views or models of reality (think of homogeneity in populations versus the actual individuals; none will be the exact same, but homogeneity can still be a useful term for the coarse-grained view). They can also depend on separate (but equal!) criteria or perspectives. My favorite example of this is isotropy in physics. From one perspective, something can look the same in every direction, but from every other perspective, there will be discrepancies (my favorite example of this is standing on top of a sombrero versus anywhere on the brim).

As an example of this, let's take a look at "Harrison Bergeron" again. The people of the United States in the year 2081 were all forced to be "equal" through imposed handicaps on people above average in any way. The result of this was equal outcome, but only in the sense of statistics like GDP. What the story fails to take into account (perhaps intentionally; I don't actually know Vonnegut's reasoning behind writing this) is the ear-splitting pain that George Bergeron experiences all day while his wife, Hazel, didn't. Examined this way, that sounds like a pretty unequal (and unfair!) outcome. The Handicapper General possessed a shotgun which she could use for enforcement of the law. Other people did not have the same authority, and they didn't have shotguns either. The most that could be said was that they actually had equality of opportunity in becoming the Handicapper General.

My goal in this is not to disparage "Harrison Bergeron" or to make the case for total equality, but I think it's important to get definitions straight. It's conceivable for there to be a society that has true equality of outcome while still not being homogeneous. This does not mean that it is useful to strive for that society, but it could most certainly be.

Let us now consider how different equality of opportunity outcome truly are. Now, "equality of opportunity" is usually used in reference to law and societal pressures, but just for the moment, let's entertain the literal definition so that we can get concepts straight. There are a great deal many opportunities that rely upon previous outcomes; indeed, I can't think of a single opportunity that is not at least partially based on the successful outcome of biological development. I don't think people would object to the treatments of disabilities and illnesses, despite the fact that these would be very material attempts to achieve healthy outcomes, which generally means within the range of "normal". I know people would object to my use of this as an example, saying something along the lines of "Treatment of disability and illness is not the same as imposing a university quota." and they'd be correct. I'm not saying that top-down impositions on what people choose to do is a good idea; I'm saying that attempts at equality of outcome don't have to be top-down. I'm also saying that equality of opportunity can depend upon equality of outcome, not just vice-versa.